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CML PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF .AD-
JUDICATION. By Paul D. Carrington. Boston: Little, Brown. 1969. 
Pp. XXX, 968. $14. 
Law schools have come full circle. Christopher Langdell took us 
from rule and pleading and court to case and theory and university. 
But we are tired of that journey. And so we now see another path 
charted-this time away from university, cases, and theory and back 
to rule, pleading, and court. Doctrine is in a bad way. The death 
knell has been sounded for the Langdellian casebook. Those won-
derful chapters of over-edited cases, each inserted to prove the pre-
cise legal point which its neighbor was inserted to deny, are becom-
ing antiques. Specialists in the ways of legal orchestration and of 
doctrinal point-counterpoint are no longer the practitioners of an 
admired art. Doctrine as a framework for a casebook, therefore, has 
been fairly well, and perhaps justly, repudiated. 
If a casebook editor is thoughtful, however, he is put to a hard 
choice. On the one hand, he is quite willing to break with the doc-
trinal past. On the other hand, he still wants to write a book with an 
intellectual framework-a book which will be solid and serviceable. 
Professor Carrington's resolution of this problem makes a good deal 
of sense. 
At the end of chapter 2, in an interesting section on the effective 
use of his book, Professor Carrington says that "[i]t is now apparent 
that the cases contained in this book were not selected for the pur-
pose of communicating doctrine through the language of inductive 
reasoning" (p. 171). Carrington's chosen framework for his book is 
not doctrine but process, and he views the process of civil litigation 
through a lens which is informed and unopinionated. 
This book of 951 pages of text is divided into eleven chapters. 
The first section of the book is designed to require the student to 
"face almost the whole course at once in a first view" (p. 171). That 
first view comprises 170 pages and absorbs two chapters. Thus, chap-
ter I grapples with problems of enforcing a judgment and attempts 
as well to expose something of the range in the variety of relief that 
courts can fashion. Chapter 2 discusses first the meaning of the ap-
pellate process and then exceptions to the final-decision rule. There 
is utility in attempting to teach the arcana of interlocutory-order 
problems after the student has examined the appellate process. Once 
the student has reflected on what an appeal is, he is in a better posi-
tion to assess the wisdom of the various exceptions to the general 
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theme of federal practice that interlocutory orders are not appeal-
able. 
Chapter 3, "Persons in Power: The Decision Makers," calls at-
tention to the men who staff the judicial process. The first section 
of the chapter inquires into qualifications for judicial office. The 
inclusion of materials on judicial qualifications is a timely but rare 
undertaking in procedure casebooks. The bewildered response to 
l'affaire Haynesworth is proof enough of that. Chapter 3 also deals 
with the removal of judges and with disqualification in particular 
cases-again matters to which we have had, and to which we are 
likely to have, continuing exposure. The chapter concludes with an 
introduction to the role of the jury in the judicial process. 
In chapter 4, the focus shifts to the trial situation. That chapter 
discusses the different fact-finding roles of judge and jury. Chapter 
5 is concerned with the role that the adversary process plays in 
making a factual record. Chapter 6 opens with a study of the dis-
covery process and follows with a discussion on pleadings. Thus, the 
problem of pleading, with which some procedure teachers might 
begin a book in procedure, comes after the material on discovery. 
Pleading, in other words, is not directly encountered by the student 
until nearly the middle of the book. Pedagogically, putting dis-
covery before pleading is quite reasonable. Use of the opposite se-
quence, the more common tack, often does some damage to the 
hopes of the new world of federal discovery, because students be-
come prematurely fond of the complaint to the disadvantage of 
subsequent appreciation of the discovery devices. It is at this junc-
ture in the book that the reader begins to comprehend the editor's 
intention, candidly stated in the introduction, that "proceeding 
backward" (p. 4) to the study of the judicial process is a conscious 
design of the book. He argues that some of the difficulties encoun-
tered prior to trial are best understood after there has been exposure 
to the problems of trial. That argument, presumably, explains why 
the materials on trial precede the materials on discovery and plead-
ing. 
The balance of the book covers not only the frequently encoun-
tered materials on federal jurisdiction, res judicata, and multi-party 
litigation, but also less traditional subjects, such as professional re-
sponsibility and contingent-fee problems, both of which are often 
scorned or underplayed in procedure courses. 
There is little of the how-to-do-it approach in this book: no es-
says on drafting, no appendices full of stale pleadings. Similarly 
there is very little concession to the fashions of the moment. Per-
haps there is in this regard too little concession. It is interesting 
that, in the preface to the recent edition of their successful and in-
fluential book, Professors Field and Kaplan make the remark that, 
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although they decided in their new edition to adhere "to the cover-
age, the method, and the objectives that appealed to us when we 
began our collaboration,"1 nevertheless-and to me these are very 
interesting reflections-their temptation to depart from the first 
edition was strong: 
Certainly one can imagine a worthy and viable course in which 
a study of the besetting facts of delay and expense of litigation 
would displace a good deal of preoccupation with procedural doc-
trine. There are other alternative patterns for the course that would 
make contemporary sense. But for the present we have stuck to our 
last.2 
Indeed, delay and expense of litigation could well make the theme 
of a procedure book. 
The emphasis in Carrington's volume, however, is institutional; 
the basic theme is process, and in terms of evoking that theme the 
book succeeds. Carrington's implicit suggestion is that the judicial 
process, the rules of procedure, and the problems of federal juris-
diction (on which this book has particularly rich materials) are es-
sentially serviceable to the social needs which litigation is designed 
to satisfy. But he is realistic enough to point out that use of the 
process is quite often found to be on a level less than optimal. Chap-
ter 7, "Protection Against Misuse of the Process," is in this regard 
an especially critical and useful chapter. 
In his introduction Professor Carrington writes that his book has 
a hero: "The hero is the romantic ideal that power can be made 
to serve principles rather than the men who wield it" (p. 1). He says 
also that only "the simple minded will believe that power always 
and unerringly responds to law" (p. I). I think it clear that these 
remarks display a liberal and a humanist faith in the courts and 
their processes-a faith that is quite different from the activist or 
instrumentalist faith in courts. Ralph Nader has recently pointed 
out, in that remarkable and non-self-serving honesty which is the 
despair of his critics, that recent efforts by consumers in the courts 
have, on the whole, not changed the social landscape as much as the 
rhetoric expended on the subject might indicate. Carrington's low-
keyed approach to the teaching of procedure is not founded on ex-
pectations that the judicial process will win very many social revolu-
tions. What he gives us is a competent introduction to the uncer-
tainties of procedure. The book is an effort to acquaint the student 
with the way courts, particularly the federal courts, manage not only 
themselves, but also the lawyers and problems that come before 
1. R. FIELD &: B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN ClvIL PROCEDURE xii 
(temp. 2d ed. 1968). 
2. Id. 
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them. The student is encouraged to expect courts to behave fairly, 
but not, I take it, momentously. 
Looking at the book as a whole, then, it is clear that Professor 
Carrington is addressing a very particular kind of student. These 
materials were used by the author and others in unpublished form. 
Carrington comments on that experience in the book: 
Experience reveals that many students are frustrated by the 
open-ended and speculative character of this presentation. It is to 
be expected that only individuals with the greatest sense of emo-
tional security can draw solace from the uncertainty that charac-
terizes the judicial process. At some point, however, the educational 
establishment must admit that it has run out of right answers about 
which it can be reassuring. [P. 172.] 
This frankness and honesty of approach characterize a new and in-
teresting volume in a rapidly growing bookshelf of procedure case-
books. 
Jerome A. Barron, 
Professor of Law, 
National Law Center, 
George Washington University 
